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We study the effects of information sharing on optimal contracting in a vertical hierarchies model with moral 
hazard and effort externalities. The paper has three main objectives. First, we determine and compare the 
equilibrium contracts with and without communication. We identify how each principal relates her agent’s wage to 
the opponent’s performance when they share information about agents’ performances. It turns out that the type of 
effort externalities across organizations is the main determinant of the responsiveness of each agent’s reward to 
the opponent’s performance. Second, in order to throw novel light on the emergence of information sharing 
agreements, we characterize the equilibria of a non- cooperative game where principals first decide whether to 
share information and then offer contracts to their exclusive agents. We explore the implications of introducing 
certification costs and show that three types of equilibria may emerge depending on the nature and (relative) 
strength of effort externalities: principals bilaterally share information if agents’ effort choices exhibit strong 
complementarity; only the principal with stronger monitoring power discloses information in equilibrium for 
intermediate levels of effort’s complementarity; principals do not share information if efforts are substitutes and for 
low values of effort’s complementarity. Moreover, differently from the common agency framework studied in Maier 
and Ottaviani (2009), in our model a prisoner’s dilemma may occur when efforts are substitutes and certification 
costs are negligible: if a higher effort by one agent reduces the opponent’s marginal productivity of effort the 
equilibrium involves no communication although principals would jointly be better off by sharing information. 
Finally, the model also offers novel testable predictions on the impact of competition on the basic trade-off 
between risk and incentives, the effects of organizations’ asymmetries on information disclosure policies as well 
as on the link between corporate control and the power of incentives.  
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The basic trade-o⁄ between risk and incentives, which shapes the way managerial compensations are opti-
mally designed under moral-hazard, has been extensively studied in economics, ￿nance and management.
Stemming from Holmstr￿m (1979), this literature has been developed in various directions. For instance,
by combining the stock price formation process with optimal contracting (e.g., Holmstr￿m and Tirole,
1993; Bolton et al., 2006), by studying the e⁄ects of product market competition on managerial slack (e.g.,
Hart, 1983; Schmidt, 1997; Raith, 2003; Piccolo et. al, 2008) or by emphasizing the relationship between
authority and monetary incentives within complex organizations (see Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005, for
a recent survey). Yet, so far, only very few papers have explored the link existing between the optimal
design of managerial compensations and organizations￿incentives to share information ￿ e.g., Calzolari
and Pavan (2006), Maier and Ottaviani (2009) and Piccolo (2011).
Over the last years, the emergence of trade associations and strategic alliances, together with the
di⁄usion of information-intensive channels, has promoted the dissemination and exchange of information
among ￿rms in many industries ￿ see, e.g., Jappelli and Pagano (2001), Briley et al. (1994) and Anderson
et al. (2001). Disclosing private information and communicating interactively with cross-boundary partners
has become a strategic management activity. In several cases, this involves channel partners who invest
in bundles of sophisticated information technology1 not only to disseminate information within a given
organization, but also across its borders. Indeed, while traditional disclosure outlets through which ￿rms
convey information about their market performance, earnings and ￿nancial structure involve annual reports,
special purpose reports and press release, in recent years corporate websites have become one of the main
channels through which ￿rms communicate ￿ see, e.g., Aerts et. al (2004).
Information sharing agreements are usually seen as institutions that enhance e¢ ciency thanks to learn-
ing and imitation, but it is also reasonable to believe that the information disclosed through these systems
might allow ￿rm owners to better discipline their management and, at the same time, to in￿ uence the
strategic forces shaping the competitive arena. What is the e⁄ect of communication on the basic trade-o⁄
between risk and incentives in a model with competing vertical organizations? What are the costs and
bene￿ts of transparency when managerial activity generates cross-￿rm externalities? How does competi-
tion impact on the power of incentives under these agreements? Why do some ￿rms disclose their market
performance, while others prefer not to communicate such information?
We address these issues in a stylized vertical hierarchies set-up where two independent principals (own-
ers or shareholders) deal with a pair of exclusive agents (managers) under the threat of moral hazard.2
Managers￿actions are unveri￿able and contracts can depend only on imperfect measures of their e⁄orts,
performances are independently distributed and contracts are secret. The paper has three main objectives.
First, we determine and compare equilibrium contracts with and without communication. When principals
1Such as telecommunication and satellite linkages, bar coding and electronic scanning systems, database management
systems, etc.
2Exclusive deals are realistic in many other employment relationships because of labor natural indivisibility, human capital
accumulation, specialization costs etc ￿ see, e.g., Caillaud et al., (1995).
2share information about agents￿performances, we identify how each principal relates the own agent￿ s wage
to the opponent￿ s performance. It turns out that the type of e⁄ort externalities across organizations is the
main determinant of the responsiveness of each agent￿ s reward to the opponent￿ s performance. In particu-
lar, when managers￿e⁄orts are substitutes, it is less convenient for a principal to induce high e⁄ort relative
to the single-hierarchy (monopoly) benchmark: in this case the marginal productivity of each agent￿ s e⁄ort
decreases with the opponent￿ s e⁄ort. By contrast, when e⁄orts have a complementary nature, there are
positive externalities to be exploited across the two organizations. Hence, the equilibrium bonus exceeds
the monopoly level.
Second, in order to throw novel light on the emergence of information sharing agreements and voluntary
disclosure policies, we characterize the equilibria of a non-cooperative game where principals ￿rst decide
whether to share information and then o⁄er contracts to their exclusive agents. We explore the implications
of introducing ￿xed certi￿cation costs and show that, depending on the nature and the (relative) strength
of e⁄ort externalities, three types of equilibria may emerge: principals bilaterally share information if
agents￿e⁄ort choices exhibit strong complementarity; only the principal with stronger monitoring power
discloses information in equilibrium for intermediate levels of e⁄ort￿ s complementarity; principals do not
share information if e⁄orts are substitutes and for low values of e⁄ort￿ s complementarity.
Interestingly, the existence of an equilibrium where only ￿rms with stronger monitoring power disclose
information is consistent with the recent empirical evidence. Many ￿rms disclose voluntarily information
beyond levels mandated by ￿nancial and accounting regulations. Still, other ￿rms seem to disclose as
little information as they can. For instance, using a sample of 152 Fortune 500 retailers￿websites, Bodkin
and Perry (2004) found that the more pro￿table companies were likely to use web-based communication
systems. Hence, our model partly contributes to explain this evidence.
Moreover, the equilibrium characterization derived in the paper also shows that, di⁄erently from the
common agency framework studied in Maier and Ottaviani (2009), with exclusive deals a prisoner￿ s dilemma
may occur when e⁄orts are substitutes and certi￿cation costs are negligible: principals always bene￿t from
sharing information, but in equilibrium they do not communicate if a higher e⁄ort by one agent reduces
the opponent￿ s marginal productivity of e⁄ort ￿ i.e., when e⁄orts are substitutes. Moreover, principals￿
gain from communication is decreasing with respect to own monitoring power and increasing with the
opponent￿ s one.
Third, the model o⁄ers a number of testable predictions on the impact of competition on the basic
trade-o⁄ between risk and incentives, the e⁄ects of organization asymmetries on information disclosure
policies as well as on the link between corporate control and the power of incentives. More precisely, we
show that the type of interaction between managerial e⁄orts contributes to explain the complex relationship
between risk and incentives. In line with the evidence collected by the empirical literature investigating the
validity of the basic agency model under moral hazard ￿ see Prendergast (2002) for a survey ￿ also in our
model the prediction is ambiguous, and depends (among other things) on the interplay between managers￿
risk-aversion and the nature of ￿rms￿strategic interaction. In addition, we also derive predictions on the
link between the strength of corporate control in one ￿rm, which is measured in our set-up by the volatility
3of its manager￿ s performance, and the bonus o⁄ered to the opponent manager. It turns out that if e⁄orts
are substitutes, an increase in one principal contractual power vis-￿-vis her agent makes the opponent
principal more willing to o⁄er high-powered incentives, while the converse obtains with complementary
e⁄orts.
Finally, in an extension, we also characterize the equilibrium contracts and information sharing decisions
under the hypothesis of correlation among performances. It turns out that, when the e⁄ort interaction
term is negligible, the nature of correlation ￿ i.e., negative or positive ￿ - is a key determinant of the
responsiveness of each agent￿ s reward to the opponent￿ s performance. Essentially, principals seek to design
contracts in such a way to exploit correlation to reduce agents￿risk-premium. Therefore, when performances
are positively (resp. negatively) correlated, risk-diversi￿cation requires a principal to punish (resp. reward)
her agent when the rival agent performs well. Moreover, we show that when certi￿cation costs are positive
there is a unique ine¢ cient equilibrium where principals do not share information. If certi￿cation costs
are negligible, multiple communication equilibria may emerge, and the one with bilateral information
sharing is the most e¢ cient one. Besides providing additional insights about the way contract design
and information sharing decisions interplay with vertical hierarchies, this also suggests that the insights
obtained in the baseline model with independent performances carry over to a more general context where
e⁄ort externalities and correlation among performances are both at play.
Summing up, the paper o⁄ers a theory of information sharing among vertical organizations under
moral hazard. The model delivers a number of predictions not only on the internal organization of ￿rms
but also on the process of interaction and communication among independent organizations. These results
provide ready to use guidelines for interpreting and designing future empirical investigations. Although
we will develop the formal arguments in an abstract framework and focus on its implications for execu-
tive compensations, the scope of our conclusions has a wider scope and applies to any model involving
horizontal externalities among agents dealing with exclusive principals, be it procurement contracting,
manufacturers/retailers deals, patent licensing, insurance and credit relationships.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 relates our paper to the existing literature.
Section 3 sets-up the model. Section 4 provides the equilibrium characterization. Section 5 presents the
equilibrium analysis of the information sharing game. Section 6 extends the model to the case of correlated
performances. Section 7 concludes. Proofs are in the Appendix.
2 Related literature
Stemming from Novshek and Sonnenschein (1982), Clarke (1983), Vives (1984), and Jappelli and Pagano
(1993), numerous contributions have studied the costs and bene￿ts of transparency in oligopolistic3 and
credit4 markets. While in the banking literature information sharing about borrowers usually promotes
3See, e.g., Gal-Or (1985), Shapiro (1986), Raith (1996), Khun and Vives (1995), among others.
4See, e.g., Padilla and Pagano (1997) and (2000), Manove et al. (2001), Carlin and Rob (2009), Bennardo et al. (2011)
among many others.
4e¢ ciency by allowing lenders to better screen investment projects (adverse selection) or to avoid the danger
of opportunistic behavior by borrowers (moral hazard), in oligopolistic contexts communication may help
￿rms to overcome coordination problems and, hence, facilitate implicit collusion. The bene￿cial role of
experts, which acquire and disclose information to trading partners, has been studied in the intermediation
literature ￿ see, e.g., Lizzeri (1999) and Gromb and Martimort (2007). The related work on consumers￿
privacy considered, instead, environments where sellers can use information on individual purchasing his-
tory to engage in product customization and price discrimination ￿ see, e.g., Acquisti and Varian (2005),
Dodds (2003) and Taylor (2004). More recently, the role of communication has been studied in the ￿ net-
works￿literature, where people in the same network exchange private information ￿ see, e.g., Calv￿ et al.
(2009) and Hagenbach and Koessler (2010).
These papers o⁄er numerous insights on the emergence of information sharing agreements, but they
all focus on the traditional case where communicators are black-boxes and are thus silent on the interplay
between information exchange and agency con￿ icts within and across organizations. The literature linking
internal organization issues with the complex question of communication between ￿rms has started recently
and is still in its infancy. Following the adverse selection tradition, Calzolari and Pavan (2006) consider
a sequential common agency game where principals contracting with the same agent learn through costly
contracting and then share the elicited information with rivals. In these games, players acquire private
information via the contracting interaction with common parties, and create new private information by
taking decisions that a⁄ect both rivals and contractual counterparts. Following this approach, Piccolo
(2011) studies a vertical hierarchies model where competing principals learn their (exclusive) agents￿costs
through direct revelation mechanisms and then eventually share this information. In the moral hazard
paradigm, Maier and Ottaviani (2009) study the costs and bene￿ts of transparency in a common agency
game where principals dealing with a common agent commit to share information about his performance
in order to relax incentive constraints.5
Our paper complements this literature by studying the novel case where deals are exclusive, exactly as
in Piccolo (2011), but the agency problem is one of moral hazard, as in Maier and Ottaviani (2009). The
main di⁄erences between our model and those analyzed in Calzolari and Pavan (2006) and Piccolo (2011)
are the following: ￿rst, we focus on moral hazard rather than adverse selection, second and perhaps more
importantly, in our model agents are risk averse, whereas they both focus on the case of risk neutrality.
As for the moral hazard literature, the major di⁄erence with Maier and Ottaviani (2009) lies in the
contractual structure and the role of certi￿cation costs: they analyze an intrinsic common agency model,
we focus on exclusive deals and show that, in these games, principals￿equilibrium communication behavior
might be asymmetric depending on their di⁄erent degree of monitoring power. When certi￿cation costs are
negligible, we also show that, in contrast to what happens in Maier and Ottaviani (2009) common agency
game, ine¢ cient equilibrium outcomes involving no communication may emerge.
5Bennardo et. al (2011) also study information sharing in a moral hazard context. However, in their multi-banking set-up
principals share information about contractual rules and not about performance. In this respect our model has a di⁄erent
￿ avour.
53 The model
Players. There are two principals (owners or shareholders), P1 and P2, and two exclusive agents (managers),
A1 and A2. Shareholders own all productive assets, but have no expertise to manage them. Hence, ￿rms
must be run by self-interested managers. Principal Pi￿ s gross pro￿t (yi) is jointly determined by the agents￿
e⁄orts (ai; i = 1;2) and by an additive random component ("i), namely:
yi = ai + ￿aiaj + "i; 8i;j = 1;2; i 6= j; (1)
where "i s N(0;￿2
i), with ￿2
i ￿ 0 for each i = 1;2. As in Maier and Ottaviani (2009), we assume that
the random variables "1 and "2 are independent so as to isolate the pure e⁄ects of competition from those
due to correlation.6 E⁄ort is unobservable and unveri￿able. Hence, Pi cannot write a contract contingent
on Ai￿ s e⁄ort (ai), but only on his performance (yi). The variance component ￿2
i re￿ ects the strength of
Pi￿ s corporate control: a lower (resp. higher) ￿2
i means that yi is more (resp. less) informative about Ai￿ s
e⁄ort ai. Or, alternatively, a low ￿2
i implies a strong monitoring power of Pi vis-￿-vis Ai.
The parameter ￿ 2 R measures the type of (strategic) interaction between the agents￿e⁄orts: ￿ < 0
(resp. > 0) means that e⁄orts create negative (resp. positive) externalities across the two organizations.
Both cases have clear applications in practice. Negative externalities capture those instances in which
￿rms compete on some dimensions. In the product market example, Ai￿ s e⁄ort allows ￿rm i to produce a
more appealing product, which in turn makes Aj￿ s e⁄ort less productive. By contrast, positive externalities
capture those situations in which managers￿conduct generates complementarities across ￿rms ￿ e.g., basic
R&D investments, informative advertising campaigns.
Communication. We analyze a two stage game (hereafter G) where principals ￿rst decide simultaneously
and independently whether to share information. Once made, these ￿rst-stage decisions become observable
to all players. Then, principals o⁄er contracts, agents choose e⁄ort, performances realize and payments
are made.
There are three communication regimes (subgames following the ￿rst-stage disclosure decisions) to
be analyzed. The regime without communication: there is no exchange of information and each principal
rewards own agent only on the basis of his own performance. The regime with bilateral information sharing:
both principals commit to pool the information about their agents￿performances ￿ see, e.g., Maier and
Ottaviani (2009). In this case, each agent Ai can be rewarded not only on the basis of his own performance
(yi), but also according to his opponent￿ s performance (yj). The regime with unilateral information sharing
where only one principal commits to share information.
Finally, we assume that disclosing private information is costly: each principal who commits to share
information must invest an amount F ￿ 0. One can think of F, hereafter certi￿cation costs, as including
all those legal and technological expenses necessary to provide timely and reliable information.
6Bolton and Dewatripoint (2005, Ch. 4) explain why correlation may facilitate the emergence of an information sharing
agreement in these games. In an extension we show how the introduction of correlation a⁄ects our analysis.
6Contracts. We restrict attention to the class of linear contracts ￿ see, e.g., Holmstr￿m and Milgrom
(1987).7 Principals make take-it-or-leave-it o⁄ers to their exclusive agents. Contracts depend on the
outcome of the ￿rst-stage information sharing game.
￿ If Pj commits not to share information, Pi￿ s contract o⁄er to Ai entails a wage which is a linear
function of the realized pro￿t yi ￿ i.e.,
wi(yi) = ￿i + ￿iyi; 8i = 1;2: (2)
Where ￿i is the ￿xed wage and ￿i is the (linear) incentive component (bonus).
￿ If Pj commits to share information, Pi￿ s contract o⁄er to Ai entails a wage which is a linear function
of both yi and yj ￿ i.e.,
wi(yi;yj) = ￿i + ￿iyi + ￿iyj; 8i;j = 1;2; i 6= j: (3)
The parameter ￿i measures how Ai￿ s incentive scheme reacts to Aj￿ s performance; clearly, for ￿i = 0 the
schemes in (2) and (3) are equivalent.
Contracts are secret. Hence, they have no strategic value.8
Timing. The timing of the game is as follows:
￿ (T = 0) Principals independently and simultaneously decide whether to share information.
￿ (T = 1) The information sharing decisions become common knowledge to all players and accordingly
principals (simultaneously) o⁄er contracts.
￿ (T = 2) Agents choose e⁄orts, pro￿ts realize and principals share information if they committed to
do so. Finally, payments are made.
Each player￿ s outside option is normalized to zero with no loss of insights. For obvious reasons we rule out
the possibility of side transfers across players belonging to di⁄erent organizations.
Equilibrium concept. The equilibrium concept is Perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) with the added
passive beliefs re￿nement ￿ i.e., when an agent is o⁄ered a contract di⁄erent from the one he expects in
equilibrium, he does not revise his beliefs about the contract o⁄ered to the other agent ￿ see Katz (1991)
among others.
7We will make assumptions on the agents￿certainty utility function such that this restriction is with no loss of generality
when contracts are secret.
8The commitment value of observable contracts have been extensively analyzed in the traditional IO literature ￿ see, e.g.,
Fershtman and Judd (1987) among many others. We will abstract from this issue by assuming that contracts are secret.
7Assumptions. Principals are risk neutral: Pi maximizes expected (gross) pro￿ts net of the linear wage ￿
i.e.,
E[yi ￿ wi (:)]; 8i = 1;2:
Agents are risk averse with CARA preferences and additively separable e⁄ort cost. Hence, agent Ai￿ s
certainty utility is:
ui(wi;ai) = 1 ￿ e￿r(wi￿ (ai)); 8i;j = 1;2; i 6= j;
where the function   (ai) measures the e⁄ort cost (disutility) in monetary terms. The parameter r > 0
indicates the absolute risk-aversion index which, for simplicity, is common to both agents. These hypothe-
ses are usually justi￿ed with the argument that shareholders can better diversify risks relative to their
employees.
We shall assume that the e⁄ort cost is quadratic   (ai) = a2
i=2. Finally, to keep the analysis tractable,
it will be convenient to derive our results for ￿ small, so that expected pro￿ts will be computed through
Taylor expansions. This will allow us to identify the ￿rst-order e⁄ects of information sharing and neglect
the second-order ones.
The single-hierarchy (monopoly) benchmark. Before turning to the equilibrium analysis, recall that in the
standard case of no competition (￿ = 0), the agent￿ s e⁄ort choice satis￿es the ￿rst-order condition ai = ￿i,







; 8i = 1;2: (4)
Hence, both a higher volatility (￿2
i) and a higher risk aversion index (r) induce Pi to o⁄er a low-powered
incentive scheme. This is because more uncertainty makes the realized pro￿t yi a worse indicator of Ai￿ s
e⁄ort and greater risk-aversion commands a larger risk-premium for the agent ￿ see, e.g., Bolton and
Dewatripont (2005, Ch. 4) and La⁄ont and Martimort (2002, Ch. 4). In the next section we will study
how the introduction of the e⁄ort interaction term ￿ shapes the equilibrium contracts with and without
information sharing.
4 Equilibrium contracts
In this section we characterize the equilibrium contracts in every possible subgame following the ￿rst-stage
information sharing decisions. Namely, the regime without information sharing where principals do not
communicate, the bilateral information sharing regime where both principals commit to share information
and the unilateral information sharing regime where only one principal shares information.
4.1 No information sharing
Consider ￿rst the regime where principals do not share information. Note that, given the CARA hypothesis,
it is convenient to carry out the analysis in terms of the certainty equivalent agents obtain upon choosing
8a given level of e⁄ort. Using the wage function in (2) together with the performance structure in (1), we
have that:
wi(yi) = ￿i + ￿iai + ￿￿iaiaj + ￿i"i; 8i;j = 1;2; i 6= j:
Hence,
CEn







The last term in the equation above is the risk premium required by Ai for the uncertainty borne.
Each principal chooses the compensation scheme so as to maximize (net) expected pro￿ts subject to
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For any pair of contracts w1 (:) = ￿1 +￿1y1 and w2 (:) = ￿2 +￿2y2, incentive compatibility implies the
following second-stage reaction functions:9
an
i (an
j ) = ￿i + ￿￿ian
j ; 8i;j = 1;2; i 6= j; (6)
where an
j denotes Aj￿ s equilibrium e⁄ort level under no communication. Hence, in the standard case where
￿i > 0, e⁄orts are strategic substitutes (resp. complements) if ￿ < 0 (resp. > 0). Note that, given
Aj￿ s equilibrium e⁄ort an
j , principal Pi can induce agent Ai to choose any desired e⁄ort simply by picking
the right bonus ￿i. If ￿ < 0 making the agent￿ s incentive scheme more responsive to his performance ￿
i.e., increasing ￿i ￿ has two opposing e⁄ects on the equilibrium e⁄ort. Clearly, a higher ￿i increases the
intercept of the reaction function an
i (:), which tends to increase the equilibrium e⁄ort everything else being
kept equal (exactly as in the single-hierarchy benchmark). However, a higher ￿i also makes the reaction
function an
i (:) steeper, which reduces the equilibrium e⁄ort when ￿ < 0. Hence, if e⁄orts are substitutes,
competition limits the use of high-powered incentives under no information sharing.
The next lemma characterizes the second-stage e⁄orts when both agents are o⁄ered the equilibrium
contracts.
Lemma 1. Let ￿n










; 8i;j = 1;2; i 6= j:
9Given concavity of CEi with respect to ai, we can use the First-Order approach ￿ see, e.g., Rogerson (1985) and Jewitt
(1988).












A higher bonus ￿i fosters agent Ai￿ s equilibrium e⁄ort an
i exactly as in the single-hierarchy benchmark.
Moreover, the impact of ￿j on an
i depends on the sign of the slope of Ai￿ s reaction function, that is on
￿￿n
i . In the standard case where agent Ai￿ s reward is positively correlated with his performance ￿ i.e.,
if ￿i > 0 ￿ a higher ￿j induces Ai to work more (resp. less) if the e⁄ort externality is positive (resp.
negative): a standard strategic e⁄ect similar in spirit to the one shaping ￿rms￿equilibrium behavior in
oligopoly models.












j )(1 + ￿an
j ); 8i;j = 1;2; i 6= j:
Substituting ￿n
i (an


















Optimizing with respect to ￿i and rearranging terms, the ￿rst-order necessary and su¢ cient condition
for a maximum entails:
(1 + ￿an
j )2 ￿ r￿2
i￿i ￿ ￿i(1 + ￿an
j )2 = 0; 8i;j = 1;2; i 6= j: (7)
Increasing the bonus ￿i has three e⁄ects on Pi￿ s expected pro￿t. First, a high-powered incentive
scheme ￿ i.e., a larger ￿i ￿ elicits agent Ai￿ s e⁄ort, which (ceteris paribus) triggers a better performance
in expected terms: a performance-enhancing e⁄ect measured by the ￿rst term in (7). Clearly, this e⁄ect
strengthens (resp. weakens) when e⁄orts are complements (resp. substitutes) and Aj￿ s e⁄ort increases
(resp. diminishes). Second, a higher ￿i also makes Ai more exposed to risk, hence Pi will need to pay a
higher risk premium: a risk-premium e⁄ect measured by the second term in (7). Finally, a higher e⁄ort also
means a higher disutility for Ai, which requires a higher reservation wage: an e⁄ort-cost e⁄ect captured
by the last term in (7).
The next proposition characterizes the equilibrium bonus under no information sharing.












8i;j = 1;2; i 6= j; (8)
10with ￿n
i ￿ ￿￿























i) ￿ sign￿(1 ￿ r￿2
i(1 + 2r￿2
j)); 8i;j = 1;2; i 6= j:
Equation (8) is a modi￿ed version of (4) obtained in the monopoly benchmark. In the competing
hierarchies model at hand, the equilibrium bonus ￿n
i accounts for a novel competitive e⁄ect. When e⁄orts
are substitutes, it is relatively less convenient for a principal to induce high e⁄ort. Hence, the bonus
will be lower than in the single-hierarchy benchmark ￿ i.e., ￿n
i < ￿￿
i. By contrast, when e⁄orts have a
complementary nature, there are complementarities to be exploited across the two hierarchies. Hence, the
equilibrium bonus exceeds the monopoly level ￿ i.e., ￿n
i > ￿￿
i.
Our model delivers a novel prediction on the link between the degree of corporate control in one ￿rm,
as measured by the volatility of its manager￿ s performance, and the bonus o⁄ered to the opponent manager
￿ i.e., on the e⁄ect of ￿2
j on ￿n
i . If e⁄orts are substitutes (￿ < 0), an increase in Pj￿ s contractual power vis-
￿-vis Aj makes Pi more willing to o⁄er high-powered incentives. This is because when the agency con￿ ict
in ￿rm j is more pronounced ￿ i.e., ￿2
j increases and it is more costly for Pj to induce e⁄ort provision by
Aj ￿ there is a competitive gain that Pi can grab by making Ai exert a higher e⁄ort. Conversely, when
e⁄orts are complements and ￿2
j increases, Pi is less willing to o⁄er high-powered incentives. This is because
a higher ￿2
j implies a lower an
j and hence weaker complementarities to be exploited.
Proposition 1 also suggests that the type of interaction between managerial e⁄orts contributes to explain
the complex relationship between risk and incentives. In line with the evidence collected by the empirical
literature investigating the validity of the basic agency model under moral hazard ￿ see Prendergast (2002)
￿ also in our model the prediction is ambiguous. In particular, when managers￿actions are strategic
substitutes (￿ < 0), the impact of risk on incentives is weaker than what the standard monopolistic set-up
would predict if managers are not too risk averse (r < 1=￿2
i) and the opposite obtains otherwise. Intuitively,
when e⁄orts are substitutes and managers are not too (resp. very) risk averse, the cost of increasing agent
Ai￿ s exposure to risk via a larger bonus ￿n
i is small (resp. large) relative to the competitive advantage that
a higher e⁄ort would secure.
Di⁄erently, when e⁄orts have a complementary nature (￿ > 0) the impact of risk on incentives is weaker
than what the standard monopolistic set-up would predict if managers are very risk averse (r > 1=￿2
i) and
the opposite obtains otherwise (when r < 1=￿2
i). Intuitively, if managers are very risk averse the cost of
increasing Ai￿ s risk exposure is large; hence, an increase in ￿2
i induces Pi to reduce ￿n
i because the negative
impact of a lower bonus on Ai￿ s e⁄ort is compensated by the e⁄ect of complementarity. When managers
are not too risk averse, instead, the cost of increasing Ai￿ s risk exposure is not so large; hence, an increase
in ￿2
i induces Pi to o⁄er a larger bonus to countervail the implied reduction of Aj￿ s e⁄ort.10
10Of course, there are other models that explain the empirical puzzle pointed out by Prendergast (2002). For instance, Szalay
(2010) builds up an hybrid single-hierarchy model with moral hazard and adverse selection that also o⁄ers mixed predictions
11Finally, the same type of arguments also explain why the equilibrium bonus with vertical hierarchies
might be more or less responsive to the risk-aversion coe¢ cient depending on the sign of ￿ and the magnitude
of r relative to the monopoly benchmark.
4.2 Bilateral information sharing
We now consider the regime where both principals share information. Again, under the CARA speci￿cation
the analysis can be conducted in terms of the certainty equivalent. Recall that in this regime the wage
structure is such that:
wi(yi;yj) = ￿i + ￿iai + ￿ (￿i + ￿i)aiaj + ￿i"i + ￿i"j; 8i;j = 1;2; i 6= j:
Hence:
CEs








i); 8i;j = 1;2; i 6= j: (9)
There are two main di⁄erences to be emphasized between the above expression and the certainty
equivalent obtained in the no information sharing regime. First, when principals share information about
their agents￿performance, agent Ai (partly) internalizes the e⁄ect of his e⁄ort choice on Pj￿ s pro￿t; and
Pi can keep this e⁄ect under her control through the choice of the additional instrument ￿i. Second,
Ai￿ s risk premium depends not only on the variance of yi but also on that of yj. Hence, ceteris paribus,
communication tends to increase risk, whereby making agents￿e⁄ort more costly for both principals.
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max
(￿i;￿i;￿i)
E(yi;yj)[yi ￿ wi (yi;yj)]
s.t.
CEs






j the equilibrium e⁄ort chosen by Aj in the information sharing regime. Using the ￿rst-order
approach again, the incentive constraints yield the following second-stage reaction functions:
as
i(as
j) = ￿i + ￿(￿i + ￿i)as
j; 8i;j = 1;2; i 6= j: (10)
Note that the introduction of information sharing modi￿es the agents￿e⁄ort choice in a non-trivial
manner. Here, the slope of Ai￿ s reaction function depends also on ￿i. Hence, in contrast to the no
information sharing regime, principals can use two instruments to control e⁄ort. Essentially, by changing
on the relationship between risk and incentives. Moreover, Raith (2003) shows that the e⁄ect of competition on incentives
might be sensitive to the speci￿c measure of competition ￿ i.e., ￿xed cost of entry or the degree of product di⁄erentiation
in a Hotelling model. Our model, however, is the ￿rst to explicitly consider both the case of substitutability and that of
complementarity.
12￿i principal Pi pins down the intercept of Ai￿ s reaction function and for any given ￿i the new variable ￿i
pins down its slope.
The next lemma characterizes the second-stage e⁄orts under information sharing when both agents are
o⁄ered the equilibrium contracts.




iyj (i;j = 1;2 and i 6= j) be the equilibrium contracts under bilateral













; 8i;j = 1;2; i 6= j:



























We conjecture, and verify ex-post, that ￿s
i > 0 for each i = 1;2.11 In this case, a higher bonus ￿i
spurs agent Ai￿ s equilibrium e⁄ort as
i, while the impact of ￿j on as
i depends on the sign of the slope of Ai￿ s
reaction function, which under communication is given by the product ￿(￿s
i + ￿s
i). What is novel here is
the comparative statics with respect to ￿i and ￿j. Clearly, making agent Ai￿ s reward more responsive to
Aj￿ s performance increases (resp. reduces) Ai￿ s e⁄ort in the case of strategic complements (resp. strategic
substitutes). The impact of ￿j on Ai￿ s equilibrium e⁄ort, instead, depends on the sign of ￿s
i + ￿s
i, which
measures the overall weight that Pi assigns to the e⁄ort interaction term ￿aiaj.



















j)); 8i;j = 1;2; i 6= j:
Substituting ￿s
i(as
j) into Pi￿ s objective, program Ps

















Optimizing with respect to ￿i and ￿i, the ￿rst-order necessary and su¢ cient conditions for an optimum
under bilateral information sharing are:
(1 + ￿as
j)2 ￿ r￿2
i￿i ￿ (￿i + ￿as
j(￿i + ￿i))(1 + ￿as




j￿i ￿ (￿i + ￿as
j(￿i + ￿i))￿as
j = 0; 8i;j = 1;2; i 6= j; (12)
11In Proposition 2 below it is shown that this conjecture is correct for ￿ small.
13respectively. Equations (11) and (12) re￿ ect the impact of information sharing on the equilibrium contracts.
As in the no information sharing regime, a higher bonus ￿i induces Ai to exert more e⁄ort, but it also calls
for a higher risk premium.
The ￿rst-order condition with respect to ￿i derived in equation (12) represents a key feature of the
regime with information sharing. It re￿ ects the (marginal) costs and bene￿ts of linking one agent￿ s com-
pensation to his opponent￿ s performance. First, as explained in the analysis of equation (10), an increase
in ￿i induces Ai to exert more costly e⁄ort and also impacts on the equilibrium e⁄ort put in by Aj. Hence,
if e⁄orts are complements (resp. substitutes) an increase in ￿i generates a positive (resp. negative) e⁄ect
on aj which, in turn, makes Pi better-o⁄ (resp. worse-o⁄). Second, conditioning the wage wi (:) on yj
makes Ai more exposed to risk, so that Pi will have to pay a higher premium for this extra uncertainty.
The next proposition characterizes the key features of the equilibrium contracts.
Proposition 2. Assume that ￿ is small. When principals share information, the equilibrium contracts
entail ￿s
i ￿ ￿n












8i;j = 1;2; i 6= j: (13)
Moreover,
￿s
i > 0; sign￿s














< 0; 8i;j = 1;2 i 6= j:
The main di⁄erence with the no information sharing regime is embedded in equation (13), which
characterizes the relationship between Ai￿ s wage and Aj￿ s performance. One key e⁄ect shapes the sign of
￿s
i. This e⁄ect hinges upon the informational externality created by the e⁄ort interaction term. If e⁄orts
create positive (resp. negative) externalities, principal Pi would like to reward (resp. punish) agent Ai
when Aj performs well. This is because when ￿ > 0 (resp. <) a higher realization of yj signals, ceteris
paribus, a higher (resp. lower) ai.
Note also that the larger is ￿2
j, the lower is ￿s
i in absolute value. This is because when ￿2
j increases
there is less to be learned about ai from the realization of yj. By contrast, the larger is ￿2
i, the higher if ￿s
i
in absolute value. This is because shareholders with weaker monitoring power need to rely more heavily
on external information to control their management. Finally, an increase of the risk-aversion coe¢ cient
r reduces the absolute value of ￿s
i because there is a large premium to give up when dealing with agents
that are more reluctant to take extra risk.
144.3 Unilateral information sharing
In what follows, we consider the asymmetric case in which one principal (say P1) shares information,
whereas P2 does not share information. Using the same techniques developed above, it is easy to show
that A1￿ s e⁄ort choice follows the rule in (6) and that, by the same token, A2￿ s e⁄ort choice follows (10).
Hence, in the asymmetric regime at hand, principal P2 has a competitive advantage in the sense that she
can use the additional information provided by P1 to control A2￿ s e⁄ort, whereas P1 can only condition
A1￿ s wage on the performance of y1. The next lemma follows:





2 (y2;y1) = ￿u
2 + ￿u
2y2 + ￿u
























































The novel feature of this regime is the positive e⁄ect of ￿u
2 on au
1 ￿ i.e., making agent A2￿ s reward more
responsive to A1￿ s performance spurs A1￿ s equilibrium e⁄ort. This is because a higher ￿u
2 increases the
slope12 of A2￿ s reaction function, which (ceteris paribus) tends to foster A1￿ s equilibrium e⁄ort regardless
of the type of e⁄ort externality ￿ i.e., irrespective of the sign of ￿. The rest of the comparative statics
results have the same interpretation as those presented in Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 above.
Coming back to the principals￿optimization programs, it is easy to verify that P1 solves Pn
1 whereas
P2 solves Ps
2. The solution of these programs leads to the following proposition.








Hence, the optimal contracts with unilateral information sharing are the same as those analyzed above.
Note, however, that e⁄orts are going to have an asymmetric structure because the principal that receives
the information about the competing agent uses this extra evidence to limit the moral hazard problem
with the own agent, whereas the principal who cannot rely on this extra information is bound to draw
inference about own agent￿ s e⁄ort only on the basis of the observed performance measure.
12Of course, when ￿ < 0 this increase has to be considered in absolute value.
155 The value of communication
Building upon the characterization derived in the previous section we can now move to describe the
equilibrium of game G. Since in our setting communication decisions are taken unilaterally, principals￿
incentives to share information hinge only upon the e⁄ect that a disclosure decision has on the e⁄ort of
the rival agent. This is because each principal chooses the optimal communication behavior for a given
information sharing decision of the opponent, and hence the latter best-reply is shaped only by the impact
of the disclosure decision on the behavior of the opponent￿ s agent.


























In the rest of the analysis we assume, with no loss of insights, that ￿2 ￿ ￿1. For throughout we have assumed
that ￿ is small, we will also make the assumption that F is not too large to avoid the uninteresting case
where information sharing is unviable under all circumstances.
The following proposition summarizes the results:





























such that game G features the following equilibrium properties:
￿ If ￿ ￿ ￿ there exists a unique PBE where both principals share information.
￿ If ￿ ￿ ￿ there exists a unique PBE where principals do not share information.
￿ If ￿ 2 (￿;￿) and F > 0 there exists a unique PBE where P1 shares information and P2 does not.
￿ ￿ ! ￿ for ￿1 ! ￿2: In this case there is only the equilibrium where both principals share information
and the equilibrium without communication.
The results in Proposition 4 are based on the trade-o⁄ between the following two forces. First, shar-
ing information a⁄ects the equilibrium e⁄orts: there is a strategic channel through which each principal
can impact on the opponent agent￿ s behavior by means of the disclosure decision. When e⁄orts have a
complementary nature (￿ > 0) principal Pi would like to commit to disclose Ai￿ s performance because, by
16doing so, Pj will be able to elicit more e⁄ort from Aj. And this will in turn bene￿t also Pi via the positive
externality. By contrast, when e⁄orts are substitutes (￿ < 0) there is no incentive to share information be-
cause the implied higher e⁄ort by Aj would reduce Pi￿ s pro￿t. Second, disclosing information in a credible
manner requires an investment that costs F, and this cost might outweight the positive (strategic) e⁄ect
of information sharing.
Hence, on the balance, the equilibirum outcome of game G is shaped by the relative strength of these two
e⁄ects. Clearly, if agents￿e⁄ort choices exhibit strong complementarity both principals ￿nd it pro￿table to
communicate in equilibrium ￿ i.e., the former strategic e⁄ect dominates the latter for both organizations.
For intermediate levels of complementarity only the principal with stronger monitoring power discloses
information in equilibrium. On the one hand, a lower bound on ￿ is needed in order to make P1, whose
e⁄ort extraction ability is stronger than P2￿ s, willing to share information and exploit the bene￿cial role
of complementarity. On the other hand, when ￿ is not too large P2 has no incentive to share information
because the bene￿t in terms of complementarity that this choice would imply is relatively smaller than
the certi￿cation cost F. Finally, for low values of complementarity the strategic e⁄ect is so weak to make
information sharing not pro￿table for both principals, and this is even more so with negative externalities
(￿ < 0).















Figure 1: Communication Game￿ Illustration of the Equilibrium Analysis (case F > 0)
In order to relate and compare more closely our analysis with the predictions of the common agency
model studied in Maier and Ottaviani (2009), it is interesting to derive the equilibrium characterization in
the limiting case where certi￿cation costs are nil (exactly as in their set-up). In this case, only the strategic
channel highlighted in the discussion of the results in Proposition 4 is at play and, in equilibrium, either
principals do not communicate or they share information bilaterally. Hence, the asymmetric equilibrium
with unilateral information disclosure discussed in Proposition 4 above disappears. The next proposition
summarizes the result:
Proposition 5. Assume that F = 0 and that ￿ is small. Game G features the following equilibrium
properties:
17￿ If ￿ > 0 there is a unique PBE where both principals share information.
￿ If ￿ < 0 there is a unique PBE where principals do not communicate.
The economic intuition of this result rests upon the arguments used to explain Proposition 4. If e⁄orts
have a complementary nature principals communicate at equilibrium because sharing information allows
them to exploit the positive externalities generated by the agents￿e⁄ort choices. By contrast, when e⁄orts
are substitutes, there is no communication at equilibirum because each principal gains when the rival is
unable to induce her own agent to exert a high e⁄ort.
Finally, to complete the comparison between our analysis and Maier and Ottaviani (2009), in the
following corollary we study the e¢ ciency properties of the equilibrium outcome obtained for F = 0.
Corollary 1. Assume that F = 0 and that ￿ is small. For ￿ > 0 the equilibrium of game G is e¢ cient.











￿2 > 0; 8i = 1;2 j 6= i:
Moreover, ￿s
i ￿ ￿n
i is increasing in ￿2
i and decreasing in ￿2
j.
This result brings out a potential con￿ ict between private and collective interests to share information.
Its intuition is straightforward. When certi￿cation costs are negligible, an information sharing agreement
enables principals to limit agents￿misbehavior and, at the same time, to internalize the externality produced
by the e⁄ort choices. This produces an incentive to coordinate that makes communication worthwhile.
Interestingly, this ￿nding di⁄ers from the insights of the (intrinsic) common agency problem analyzed
by Maier and Ottaviani (2009), where the e¢ cient outcome from the principals￿perspective is always
implemented in equilibrium. In this sense exclusive deals appear to be less e¢ cient than having a common
agent.
Note also that the gain from sharing information increases with own volatility and decreases with
the volatility of the partner with whom a principal shares information. This is because the worse is one
principal￿ s monitoring power vis-￿-vis own agent, the larger is the bene￿t of having additional informative
evidence that can be exploited to relax internal incentive constraints. By the same token, the gain from
sharing information reduces when dealing with partners with ine¢ cient monitoring technologies.
6 The role of correlation
In this section we brie￿ y analyze the case where the random variables "1 and "2 are allowed to be correlated,
and Cov("1;"2) = ￿￿1￿2, with ￿ 2 [￿1;1] being the correlation index. To isolate the e⁄ect of correlation
on the equilibrium contracts we assume that ￿ = 0, so as to neglect the role of competition. The rest of
18the set-up is as described in Section 3. As before, we assume that ￿ is small enough, so as to compute
pro￿ts by means of Taylor expansions.
First, note that the equilibrium with no communication boils down to the monopoly benchmark ￿
i.e., ￿i = ￿￿
i for i = 1;2: The case of bilateral information sharing is instead summarized in the next
proposition:
Proposition 6. Assume that ￿ is small. When principals share information the equilibrium contracts
entail ￿s
i = ￿￿









8i;j = 1;2; i 6= j: (14)
Moreover, sign￿s
i ￿ sign￿:
When performances are correlated and e⁄ort externalities are negligible, the main force shaping the
equilibrium contract is a diversi￿cation e⁄ect. The interpretation can be borrowed from the standard
CAPM analysis ￿ see, e.g., Copeland and Weston (1988). Since performances are correlated, principals
seek to design contracts in such a way to exploit correlation and reduce agents￿risk-premium. Therefore,
when performances are positively (resp. negatively) correlated, risk-diversi￿cation requires principal Pi to
punish (resp. reward) agent Ai when Aj performs well.13
The next proposition characterizes the equilibrium outcome of game G when ￿ = 0 and ￿ 6= 0.
Proposition 7. Assume that ￿ is small. Game G features the following equilibrium properties:
￿ If F > 0 there is a unique PBE where principals do not share information, this equilibrium is
ine¢ cient in the sense that principals would jointly gain from sharing information.
￿ If F = 0 every pro￿le of information sharing decisions is an equilibrium. However, the one where










￿2 > 0; 8i = 1;2:
The intuition of this result is straightforward. In absence of e⁄ort externalities the strategic channel by
which each principal can a⁄ect the opponent agent￿ s behavior by means of her disclosure decision is shut
13It can be veri￿ed that with both e⁄ort interaction and correlation the equilibrium contracts under bilateral and unilateral
information sharing entail a bonus that is equal to that obtained in the no information sharing regime ￿ i.e., ￿i = ￿
n
i ￿













￿j (1 + r￿2
i)
; 8i;j = 1;2; i 6= j: (15)
Hence, the sign of ￿
s
i depends on the relative strength of the competitive and diversi￿cation e⁄ects described above.
19down. The only spillover generated by information sharing is due to the diversi￿cation e⁄ect discussed in
Proposition 6. However, by its nature, the latter operates in the same way regardless of whether information
is shared bilaterally or unilaterally.
The implication is that if certi￿cation costs are not negligible (F > 0) the game has a unique equi-
librium with no communication. Instead, if they are negligible (F = 0) principals are indi⁄erent between
communicating agent￿ s performances and staying silent. In the latter case, the Pareto dominant equilib-
rium is the one with bilateral information sharing: communication would allow them to better diversify
risk and hence reduce agents￿premium for the additional uncertainty. This result also suggests that, when
￿ and ￿ are both di⁄erent from zero but small, the insights obtained in the baseline model with independent
performances carry over.
7 Concluding Remarks
The article has built a theory of information sharing among vertical organizations under moral hazard. The
analysis delivers a number of novel predictions not only on the internal organization of ￿rms but also on
the process of interaction and communication among di⁄erent organizations. The results provide ready to
use guidelines for interpreting and designing future empirical investigations about: (i) the determinants of
￿rms￿incentives to share information with and without certi￿cation costs; (ii) the link between the power
of incentives and competition; (iii) the impact of monitoring and contractual power on ￿rms￿internal
organization.
208 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. In the following, let ￿n
i denote the equilibrium bonus under no information sharing
as resulting from the ￿rst-stage maximization problem of principal Pi. Incentive compatibility implies:
ai(an
j ) = ￿n
i (1 + ￿an
j ):
Plugging an
j into (6) and solving for an
i and an










The expression above characterizes the optimal value of e⁄ort put in by agent Ai in the regime without
information sharing. To complete the proof, we perform the comparative statics of an
i with respect to ￿n
i
and ￿n
j . The partial derivative of an
i with respect to ￿n











whose sign is unambiguously positive, because the denominator is always positive and
1 + ￿n
j ￿ ￿ 1
for ￿ small. Finally, the derivative of an
i with respect to ￿n












In this case, the sign of the denominator is clearly positive and the sign of the numerator depends on
the product between ￿n
i and ￿.￿
Proof of Proposition 1. In the regime without information sharing, the ￿rst-order necessary and su¢ -
cient condition that determines the optimal value of ￿i is equal to
(1 + ￿an
j )2 ￿ r￿2
i￿i ￿ ￿i(1 + ￿an
j )2 = 0:












































Therefore, the ￿rst-order approximation of ￿n
i (￿) for ￿ small is equal to:
￿n
i ￿ ￿￿













It is easy to verify that the sign of ￿n
i ￿￿￿
i depends on ￿: if ￿ ￿ 0 (resp. <), the equilibrium bonus under no
information sharing and competing hierarchies rises above (resp. below) the equilibrium bonus obtained
in the monopoly benchmark.
We now turn to the comparative statics of ￿n













whose sign depends on the sign ￿￿. Instead, the derivative of the di⁄erence ￿n
i ￿ ￿￿
i with respect to the













whose sign depends on the sign ￿(1￿r￿2
i). Finally, the derivative of ￿n
i ￿￿￿














In this case, the sign of the derivative is determined by the sign of ￿(1 ￿ r￿2
i(1 + 2r￿2
j)). ￿
Proof of Lemma 2. Let ￿s
i and ￿s
i denote the equilibrium contractual bonuses under information sharing
as resulting from the ￿rst-stage maximization problem of principal Pi.
Taking the ￿rst-order condition of (ICi) in Ps

























This expression characterizes the optimal value of e⁄ort put in by agent Ai in the regime with infor-
22mation sharing. The partial derivative of as
i with respect to ￿s
















whose sign is positive for ￿ small.
The derivative of as
























i with respect to ￿s
















In this case, the sign of the derivative is univocally determined by the sign of ￿￿s
j. Finally, the derivative
of as
i with respect to ￿s



















whose sign is determined by the sign of (￿s
i + ￿s
i). ￿
Proof of Proposition 2. In the regime with bilateral information sharing, the ￿rst-order necessary and
su¢ cient conditions with respect to ￿i and ￿i are equal to, respectively:
(1 + ￿as
j)2 ￿ r￿2
i￿i ￿ (￿i + ￿as
j(￿i + ￿i))(1 + ￿as





j￿i ￿ (￿i + ￿as
j(￿i + ￿i))￿as
j = 0; 8i;j = 1;2; i 6= j: (A2)
To take the ￿rst-order approximation of the optimal ￿i and ￿iaround ￿ = 0, we start by deriving the

















































Therefore, the ￿rst-order approximation of ￿s












i positive for ￿ small. Note that the comparative statics of ￿s
i is equivalent to the one given in
Proposition 1 for ￿n
i .
Next, consider ￿s





















+ (1 ￿ ￿￿
i)￿￿














Therefore, the ￿rst-order approximation of ￿s
i around ￿ = 0 is equal to
￿s
i ￿ ￿￿













whose sign depends on the sign of ￿.
In the following, we study the comparative statics of j￿s







































which concludes the proof. ￿
Proof of Lemma 3. Let ￿u
1, ￿u
2 and ￿u
2 denote the equilibrium contractual bonuses o⁄ered under unilateral
24information sharing as resulting from the ￿rst-stage maximization problem of principals P1 and P2. As in
the proof of Lemma 2, we conjecture that ￿u
1 and ￿u
2 are positive.





































The expressions in (A3) characterize the optimal values of e⁄ort put in by agents 1 and 2 in the regime
with unilateral information sharing.
In what follows, we characterize the comparative statics of au
1 and au
2. To begin with, the partial
derivative of au
1 with respect to ￿u












whose sign is positive for ￿ small.
Then, the derivative of au
1 with respect to ￿u














thus its sign depends on the sign of ￿￿u
1.
The derivative of au
1 with respect to ￿u













In this case, the sign of the derivative is clearly positive. We now turn to the comparative statics on au
2.
The derivative of au
2 with respect to ￿u













which is positive for ￿ small.
The derivative of au
2 with respect to ￿u













25whose sign depends on ￿￿u
1.
Finally, the derivative of au
2 with respect to ￿u














and, for ￿ small, its sign is determined by the sign of ￿(￿u
2 + ￿u
2).￿
Proof of Proposition 3. We ￿rst determine the contractual speci￿cations decided by the principal that
does not share information, Pj. The ￿rst-order necessary and su¢ cient conditions to determine ￿j and ￿j
are given in the following:
(1 + ￿au
j)2 ￿ r￿2
i￿i ￿ (￿i + ￿au
j(￿i + ￿i))(1 + ￿au





j￿i ￿ (￿i + ￿au
j(￿i + ￿i))￿au
j = 0; 8i;j = 1;2; i 6= j: (A5)







j = 0; 8j = 1;2:


























Therefore, the ￿rst-order approximations of ￿u
j (￿) and ￿u




















We now turn to the determination of the contractual reward o⁄ered by the principal that shares




i￿i ￿ ￿i(1 + ￿au
j)2 = 0:














26Finally, the ￿rst-order approximation of ￿u











which completes the proof of Proposition 3. ￿
Proof of Proposition 4. To begin with, note that the third order Taylor approximations around ￿ = 0





















The expression above takes into account that, when she decides to share information, Pi needs to sink








we can establish that to share (s) is a dominant strategy for principal Pi if








F=￿i > 0 for all F > 0. Moreover, since
sign[￿i ￿ ￿j] = sign[￿j ￿ ￿i]












This all implies that if ￿ ￿ ￿ both principals 1 and 2 choose to share (s) at the equilibrium. Instead if ￿ ￿ ￿
both principals prefer not to share (n) at the equilibrium. Finally, if ￿ 2 (￿;￿) an asymmetric equilibrium
arises, in which principal 1 does not share (n) whereas principal 2 shares (s).
Notice that as ￿ ! ￿ ￿ ^ ￿, then the equilibria are two and feature both principals sharing information
if ￿ ￿ ^ ￿ and both principals not sharing information otherwise. As a special case, we have that if F = 0
then ^ ￿ = 0. ￿
Proof of Proposition 5. To derive the equilibria in Proposition 5 we followed the steps in the proof of
Proposition 4 using as restriction that F = 0.￿
Proof of Corollary 1. Assume F = 0. It is easy to verify that the second-order Taylor approximation
around ￿ = 0 of the di⁄erence between the pro￿ts of Pi when both principals share (￿s
i) and the pro￿ts

























which concludes the proof. ￿
Proof of Proposition 6. Assume ￿ = 0 and ￿ 6= 0. As in the standard case without e⁄ort externalities
(￿ = 0) and a monopolistic hierarchy, Ai￿ s e⁄ort choice satis￿es the ￿rst-order condition if as
i = ￿i, with
i = 1;2.
We can now solve the ￿rst-stage contract o⁄er game in the case featuring both principals sharing











i + 2￿i￿i￿i￿j￿) ￿ ￿ias
i ￿ ￿ias
j; 8i;j = 1;2; i 6= j:
Substituting ￿s
i(as















Optimizing with respect to ￿i and ￿i, the ￿rst-order necessary and su¢ cient conditions for an optimum
under bilateral information sharing are, respectively:
1 ￿ r￿2
i￿i ￿ r￿i￿i￿j￿ ￿ ￿i = 0; 8i;j = 1;2; i 6= j; (A6)
￿r￿2
j￿i ￿ r￿i￿i￿j￿ = 0; 8i;j = 1;2; i 6= j: (A7)
To compute the ￿rst-order approximation of the optimal ￿i and ￿i, we start by deriving the values of







i = 0; 8i = 1;2:






































i, it turns out that the ￿rst-order approximation of ￿s
i (￿) around ￿ equal to zero is
equal to ￿￿
i, while the ￿rst-order approximation of ￿s







whose sign depends on the sign of ￿. ￿
Proof of Proposition 7. First, note that in the regime with no communication the second order Taylor







which is equivalent to the pro￿ts of Pi in the monopoly benchmark.
Moreover, using the results of Proposition 6, we ￿nd that the second order Taylor expansion around











In the asymmetric case in which principal Pi communicates and principal Pj does not communicate, the
absence of externalities in e⁄ort provision, i.e. ￿ = 0, implies that the second order approximation of Pi￿ s








Instead, if principal Pi does not share information while principal Pj shares information, the second order












It follows that if F > 0 the unique equilibrium of the communication game features both principals not
sharing information (n). Instead, if F = 0 each principal is indi⁄erent between sharing and not sharing
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